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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A. Nature of Case.
This case is an appeal of defendant Junior Larry Hillbroom's (hereafter "Hillbroom")

conviction of misdemeanor violation of a no contact order. Hill broom contends that, as a matter
of law, the State cannot prove an essential element of the crime, to wit: the issuance of a valid no
contact order. The State cannot prove the issuance of a valid no contract order because the order
was fatally defective in that it failed to contain an expiration date as required by Criminal Rule
46.2(a)(3).
B. Course of Proceedings.

On September 18, 2012, Hillbroom was cited for misdemeanor Violation of a No Contact
Order. (R., Vol. I, p. 20).

On December 14, 2012, Hillbroom filed a Motion to Dismiss. (R.,

Vol. I, p. 72). On January 15, 2013, the Court issued an order denying Hillbroom's motion to
dismiss. (R., Vol. I, pp. 115-124). On January 17, 2013, a jury found Hillbroom guilty of the
crime charged. (R., Vol. I, p. 138; Tr., Vol. II 1, p. 95, L. 14-16). Hillbroom timely appealed to
the District Court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 139-140).
On October 2, 2013, the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, District Judge, affirmed the ruling of
the magistrate court. (R., Vol. I, pp. 169-175). Hillbroom timely appealed to this Court. (R.,
Vol. I, pp. 176-178).

1 Volume

I of the transcript references "Motion to Dismiss." Volume II of the transcript
references "Jury Trial."
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C. Statement of the Facts.
On June 24, 2012, Hillbroom was charged with domestic violence in violation of LC. §
18-918 in Bonner County case number CR-2012-2908. (R., Vol. I, p. 115; Tr., Vol. II, p. 12, L.
2-7). On June 25, 2012, magistrate judge Debra Heise issued a no contact order pursuant to LC. §
18-920; (R., Vol. I, p. 32; Tr., Vol. II, p. 12, L 2-7).

The no contact order required that

Hillbroom have no contact with his girlfriend, and mother of his infant baby, Candice Marie
Fournier. (R., Vol. I, p. 32; Tr., Vol. I, p. 15, L. 7 and p. 64, L. 1-19).
The order itself is on a standard court form. The form states that following:
THIS ORDER CAN BE MODIFIED ONLY BY A JUDGE AND WILL
EXPIRE: At 11 :59 p.m. on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
or upon dismissal
of this case, whichever occurs first.

(R., Vol. I, p. 32).
The judge failed to enter an expiration date in the blank portion of the form.
On August 1, 2012, Hillbroom was bound over for trial in the underlying domestic
violence matter. (R., Vol. I, p. 34 ). At the same time the magistrate modified the no contact
order to allow certain "3 rd party contact." (R., Vol. I, p. 33). Again, the expiration date was not
filled-in.
On September 18, 2012, Ms. Fournier saw Hillbroom in the parking lot outside of the
Bonner County Courthouse. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 68, L. 22-25). She decided to join Hill broom in his
truck and handed him his infant son. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 22-25). A VAST advocate, Christina
Scholten, saw Ms. Fournier enter Hillbroom's truck and hand the baby to Hillbroom. (Tr., Vol.
1, p. 24, L. 13-18 and p. 31, L. 10-14). Ms. Scholten reported the contact to a court bailiff who
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went outside and also saw the contact between Ms. Fournier and Hillbroom. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 39,
L. 24-25 and p. 40, L. 1-3).
On January 11, 2013, district judge Steve Yerby dismissed the underlying domestic
violence case on the State's motion. (R., Vol. I, p. 117, L. 12-15). On January 15, 2013, the
magistrate court denied Hillbroom's motion to dismiss, ruling that the no contact order was in
compliance with I.C.R. 46.2 even though it failed to contain an expiration date. (R., Vol. I, pp.
122-123). On January 17, 2013, a jury found Hillbroom guilty of the crime of violating a no
contact order. (R., Vol. I, p. 138; Tr., Vol. II, p. 95, L. 14-16).

IV.

ISSUE PRESENTED.
As a matter of law, can the State prove the crime of violation of a no contact order where

the no contact order is defective because it fails to comply with the mandatory requirement to set
out the order's expiration date?

V.

ARGUMENT.
The trial court held that the no contact order in this case complies with I.C.R. 46.2 even

though the court failed to set out the order's expiration date. The trial court erred. The criminal
rule, as interpreted by this Court, requires that a no contact order contain a specific expiration
date, as well as the alternative "dismissal of the case, whichever first occurs." The defect in the
Hillbroom no contact order renders the State unable to prove the crime of violation of a no
contact order, I.C. §18-920, because it cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a valid no
contact order had been issued by the court. However, the State is not without remedy. The State
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can still petition for enforcement under the contempt statutes where the order is, under the facts,
clear and unambiguous.
A. Standard of Review.

The Supreme Court has free review of the issue in this case. An appellate court exercises
free review of a trial court's decision regarding the interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule.
State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314,316 (2004). When reviewing a case on a petition
for review from a lower appellate court, the Supreme Court gives "due consideration" to the
decision of the appellate court but "directly reviews the decision of the trial court." State v. Lute,
150 Idaho 837,839,252 P.3d 1255, 1257 (2011).

B. The No Contact Order Was Defective Because It Failed To Set Out An
Expiration Date.

The no contract order issued by the magistrate court was defective because it did not
contain an expiration date as required by criminal rule and by this Court.
A court has the authority to issue a no contact order when the defendant is charged with
an alleged assault. The statute states:
When a person is charged with or convicted of an offense under section
18-901, 18-903, 18-905, 18-907, 18-909, 18-911, 18-913, 18-915, 18918, 18-919, 18-6710, 18-6711,
18-7905, 18-7906 or 39-6312,
Idaho
Code, or any other offense for which a court finds that a no contact order
is appropriate, an order forbidding contact with another person may be
issued. A no contact order may be imposed by the court or by Idaho
criminal rule.
LC.§ 18-920(1).
The form of the no contact order is set out in Criminal Rule 46.2. The rule states:
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(a) No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-920 shall be in
writing and served on or signed by the defendant. Each judicial district
shall adopt by administrative order a form for no contact orders for that
district. No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the following
information:
(1) The case number, defendant's name and victim's name;

(2) A distance restriction;
(3) That the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon
dismissal of the case~

(4) An advisory that:
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a separate crime
under I.C. § 18-920 for which no bail will be set until an appearance
before a judge, and the possible penalties for this crime,
(b) The no contact order can only be modified by a judge, and
(c) When more than one domestic violence protection order is in place,
the most restrictive provision will control any conflicting terms of any
other civil or criminal protection order.
I.C.R. 46.2(a) (emphasis added).
The trial court treated the obligation to include an expiration date on the no contact order
as discretionary. This is incorrect.

The criminal rule states that a no contact order issued

pursuant to I.C. § 18-920 "must contain" an expiration date. I.C.R. 46.2(a)(3). The word "must"
means "mandatory." Roesch v. Klemann, 155 Idaho 175,307 P.3d 192, 195 (2013).
The trial court also wrongly implied that it had a choice as to the expiration date and
therefore did not need to fill in a date certain. The trial court stated:
In this case, the No Contact Order expired by its terms upon dismissal of
the case, and because the alleged violation occurred while the case was
pending, an expiration upon dismissal of the case provided clarity and
finality.
(R., Vol. I, p. 122).
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Contrary to the trial court's interpretation, this Court has interpreted I.C.R. 46.2 to require
that the specific date be expressly set forth and that the phrase "Whichever occurs first" follow
the two expiration possibilities. By leaving the expiration date blank, the trial court in this case
made the phrase "Whichever occurs first" superfluous and the order potentially confusing to the
defendant.
Twice now, this Court has emphasized the importance of including a date certain for
expiration to avoid confusion. In State v. Castro, 145 Idaho 173, 177 P.3d 387 (2008), the Court
explained that I.C.R. 46.2 was revised in 2004 because orders that simply contained the phrase
"the no contact order will remain in effect until further order of the court" created unnecessary
confusion. The Court stated that such generalized language "enshrined perpetuity." Id. at 175,
177 P.3d at 389. Therefore, the Court revised the required language consistent with the present
statute, to wit: "[t}hat the order will expire at 11:59 p.m. on a specific date, or upon dismissal of

the case." Id. at 175-76, 177 P.3d at 389-90.
The Castro Court stressed the importance of the inclusion of an expiration date because,
as the Court stated, it "serves important public interests." Id. at 176, 177 P.3d at 390. The Court
considered it so important, in fact, that it sent a clear message to the lower courts:
[W]e expect iud2.es to provide a termination date, regardless of whether
the motion to modify or terminate the no contact order is granted.

Id. (emphasis added).
In 2010 this Court took the opportunity to reinforce the requirement that judges provide a
specific expiration date.

In State v. Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 22 P.3d 374 (2010), the Court

considered a no contact order like the one in the present case. The Cobler order provided only a
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termination date: the order "will expire ... upon dismissal of this case." Id at 771, 22 P.3d at
376. The Cobler court referenced its holding in Castro, supra, and in even more direct language
restated the requirement of a date certain for expiration:
[WJe disapproved of no contact orders with "eternal existence" and
indicated that all no contact orders issued after July 1, 2004, should have
termination dates, regardless of whether a motion to modify or terminate
the no contact order is granted.
Id. at 772, 22 P3d at 377 (emphasis added).

The Cobler court further reinforced the explicit requirement for an expiration date
in a footnote. The Court noted that the no contact form at issue in the case provided a
fill-in-the-blank for an expiration "or upon dismissal of the case." Id., n. l. The Court
explained that in order for the form to comply with I.C.R. 46.2, the blank must be filled
in with a specific expiration date. The Court stated:
The form seems to give the judge one of two choices. However, in order to
comply with the intent of I.C.R. 46.2, the judge should be given no right
of selection between the two apparent choices. The second line of the
form should contain no boxes and should read "at 11 :59 p.m. on
_____ , or upon dismissal of this case, whichever first occurs["].
Id (emphasis added).

The form employed by Bonner County, and applied in this case, conforms with
the Cobler instruction as to the proper expiration language.

Bonner County's form

avoids the "two choices" disapproved of in Cobler by adding the phrase "whichever first
occurs." However, in the case at bar, the magistrate judge failed to fill-in the specific
expiration date upon initial issuance or upon the order's modification. And, in her order
denying dismissal, the magistrate even advocated the right to "two apparent choices" in
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contravention of the Cobler instruction.
C. The No Contact Order was Fatally Defective Because The State Cannot Prove
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt that the Court Issued a Valid Order Pursuant to
I.C. § 18-920.

The no contact order in this case is fatally defective because the failure to comply with
the criminal rule rendered the order invalid under LC. § 18-920. Because it is invalid, the State
cannot prove the essential element of the crime: that a valid no contact order was issued by the
court.
In a criminal matter, the State must prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003). Conviction for violation
of a no contact order pursuant to LC. § 18-920 requires the State to prove each of the following
elements:
A violation of a no contact order is committed when:
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any offense defined in
subsection (1) of this section; and
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court or by an Idaho
criminal rule; and
(c) The person charged or convicted has had contact with the stated person
in violation of an order.
LC. § 18-920(2).
Implicit in the issuance element of the crime, LC. § 18-920(2)(b), is that the order be
valid under Idaho law. This Court has recognized "implicit" elements in criminal statutes. See
State v. Olin, 112 Idaho 673, 676, 735 P.2d 984, 987 (1987). In Olin, the Court considered

whether the words "rob," "robbery," "taking of property," implicitly describes an "intent" to
permanently deprive the victim of the property under the robbery statute. The Court stated that
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"[I]t was implicit in the common understanding of all those words that the conduct was not

intended to be anything but permanent." Id at 676, 735 P.2d at 987.
Likewise the State conceded, and the appellate court approved of an implicit element in
the statute under consideration in this case, I.C. § 18-920. In State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993,
999, 303 P.3d 1249, 1255 (Ct. App. 2013), the court of appeals implied a "notice" element of
proof that is not explicitly set forth in the statute. The court looked specifically at the criminal
rule to derive an implied element. The court stated:
Although section 18-920, under which Hochrein was charged, does not
explicitly list prior notice of the no contact order as an element, the State
concedes on appeal such notice is an essential element of the crime. The
State points out that Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, which implements section
18-920, states, "No contact orders issued pursuant to Idaho Code § 18920 shall be in writing and served on or signed by the defendant." I.C.R.
46.2(a).

Hochrein at 999, 303 P.3d at 1255.
Not only does this Court have authority to imply a validity element of proof under LC. §
18-920, it would be wise for the Court to do so. Implying a validity element to the issuance
prong would reinforce the Court's strong insistence that judges include an expiration date certain
on the order.

Prosecutors would then be attentive to its inclusion. It would have the same

salutary effect on a judge issuing a no contact order as does the search and seizure jurisprudence
have on a police officer searching a vehicle or dwelling.

Without the sword of Damocles

hanging about, judges and prosecutors will continue to ignore the Court's edict with regard to
incorporating an expiration date on the no contact orders.
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D. A Defective, But Clear No Contact Order Can Be Enforced Under the
Contempt of Court Statute.
It's important to note that by implying a validity element of proof under LC. § 18-920,
courts and prosecutors would not be left without a punishment remedy where the court has
inadvertently issued a defective no contact order.

A court always has the power to hold in

contempt a defendant who willfully violates a clear and unambiguous order of the court. LC. §
18-105; State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554,556, 181 P.3d 480,482 (2008). In this case, the prosecutor
or the trial court, sua sponte, could have enforced the no contact order under the contempt of
court statute because that statute does not impose an expiration date requirement.

A court

considering a contempt citation could properly look at the facts to determine if the order was so
defective as to make it ambiguous.
The distinction between a violation of a court order under the contempt statutes and a
violation of the order under the criminal code has been addressed by the appellate court. In State
v. Herren, 38783, 2012 WL 5464517 (App. Nov. 9, 2012), Review Granted (attached hereto as

Addendum A), the defendant, Herren, was charged with a violation of a no contact order under
LC. § 18-920. The court found that Herren was within 100 feet of McDermott in violation of the
order. However, Herren did not touch or communicate with McDermott. The Court reversed the
defendant's conviction because LC. § 18-920(c) requires proof that "The person charged ... has
had contact with the stated person in the violation of an order." (Emphasis added).

The Court

concluded that the defendant's mere presence within 100 feet of McDermott was a violation of
the order but the violation was not subject to prosecution under the criminal statute because no
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"contact" had occurred. Importantly, the Court noted in footnote 3 that the order could still be
enforced by "contempt."
The Court did point out that this finding did not mean the lower court was not
authorized to include an "in-the-presence" prohibition in the protective order.
Although such a provision could not be enforced by the criminal statute, it could
be enforceable by contempt or possibly other means.

Id at n.3.
In applying the logic of Herren to the case at bar, Hillbroom acknowledges that he
violated the court's order when he had contact with Ms. Fournier. Consequently the trial court
could have found Hillbroom in contempt sua sponte or upon petition of the State. The Court
could have imposed the same sentence.

But, because the order failed to comply with the

criminal rule, setting forth both an expiration date and a terminating event, the order was invalid
and therefore unenforceable as a crime under LC. § 18-920.

VI.

CONCLUSION.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court must reverse the magistrate court and

remand the case for dismissal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this :3~ day of January, 2014.

BERG & McLAUGHLIN, CHTD

ilham M. Berg
Attorney for Junior Hillbroom
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On review of decision of district court, rendered
in its appellate capacity, Court of Appeals
examines magistrate record to determine
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follow from those findings.
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Synopsis
Background: Following bench trial, magistrate found
defendant guilty of violating no contact order (NCO) and
violating probation previously imposed for misdemeanor
malicious injury to property. Defendant filed intermediate
appeal. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,
Kathryn A. Sticklen, J., affirmed. Defendant appealed.

Criminal Law
t=Decisions oflntennediate Courts

On review of decision of district court, rendered
in its appellate capacity, if magistrate's findings
of fact are supported by substantial and
competent evidence and conclusions follow
therefrom and if district court affirmed
magistrate's decision, Court of Appeals affirms
district court's decision as matter of procedure.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Gutierrez, J., held that
defendant did not "contact" neighbor in violation of NCO.

Reversed and remanded.

141

Criminal Law
,_~, Statutory issues in general

Gratton, Chief Judge, filed dissenting opinion.
Court of Appeals exercises free review over
application and construction of statutes.

West Headnotes ( 10)

fl!

Criminal Law
,;=Decisions oflntermediate Courts

On review of decision of district court, rendered
in its appellate capacity, Court of Appeals
reviews decision of district court directly.

15!

Statutes
,, ...,Plain language; plain, ordinary, common, or
literal meaning

Statutes
,.,,.statute as a Whole; Relation of Parts to
Whole and to One Another
Where language of statute is plain and
unambiguous, Court of Appeals must give effect
to statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction; words must be given

State v. Herren, --- P.3d ---- (2012)

their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and
statute must be construed as a whole.

161

Protection of Endangered Persons
.="No contact" orders
Although defendant violated no contact order
(NCO) by remaining within l 00 feet of neighbor
during homeowners' association meeting,
defendant did not physically touch or
communicate with neighbor, as required for
criminal conviction for violation of NCO, but
only made brief eye contact with neighbor,
which did not amount to "contact." West's
LC.A. § 18-920(2).

Statutes
c-Absence of Ambiguity; Application of Clear
or Unambiguous Statute or Language
Statutes
,.PPlain, literal, or clear meaning; ambiguity
When interpreting statutory language, if
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no
occasion for court to resort to legislative history
or rules of statutory interpretation.
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191

1101

Protection of Endangered Persons
.• ="No contact'' orders
Statute criminalizing violations of no contact
order (NCO) only criminalizes violations of
NCO where violation was contact in form of
physical touching and/or communicating.
West's LC.A. § 18-920(2).

Statutes
,.~-Purpose and intent; determination thereof
When Court of Appeals must engage in statutory
construction because ambiguity exists in
statutory language, court has duty to ascertain
legislative intent and give effect to that intent

Attorneys and Law Firms
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP; Robyn Fyffe,
Boise, for appellant. Robyn Fyffe argued.
[BJ

Criminal Law
•. ~Substantial evidence
Criminal Law
,.=Reasonable doubt
Appellate review of sufficiency of evidence is
limited in scope; finding of guilt will not be
overturned on appeal where there is substantial
evidence upon which reasonable trier of fact
could have found prosecution sustained its
burden of proving essential elements of crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M .
Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
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Opinion
GUTJERREZ, Judge.

*1 Nathan Wade Herren appeals from the district court's
order, on intermediate appeal, affirming his judgment of
conviction entered upon the magistrate's verdict finding
him guilty of violation of a no contact order and affirming
the revocation of his withheld judgment based on the
magistrate's finding that he was in violation of his
probation. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and
remand the case.
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I.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

ANALYSIS

In the course of an ongoing dispute between Herren and
his neighbor, William McDermott, Herren cut down a
portion of McDermott's fence. Herren was charged with
felony malicious injury to property and, pursuant to a plea
agreement, pied guilty to an amended charge of
misdemeanor malicious injury to property. The court
entered a withheld judgment and placed Herren on
probation for two years. In addition, the court entered a no
contact order (NCO), providing, in relevant part, that
Herren could not "knowingly remain within 100 feet of'
McDermott.

Herren contends his judgment of conviction for violating
the NCO should be vacated because the magistrate did not
find he had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the
NCO as required by the statute and there is insufficient
evidence to support such a finding. He also contends the
order revoking his withheld judgment should be reversed
because the NCO conviction cannot properly form the
basis of the probation violation where it was not
supported by sufficient evidence.

Months later, Herren filed a motion to modify the NCO to
allow him to attend homeowners' association meetings
where McDermott, an association board member, would
likely be present. Herren failed to request a hearing on the
motion and no modification was entered. Nevertheless,
Herren attended an association meeting at a local school.
When Herren first arrived, McDermott was not present,
but once McDermott entered the meeting room, Herren
made brief eye contact with him and moved to the back of
the room. McDem10tt contacted law enforcement, who
responded to the scene. Herren stated he believed he was
more than 100 feet from McDermott. Herren was arrested
for violation of the NCO after the responding officer
determined Herren had been sitting well closer than 100
feet from McDermott. Herren was charged with violating
the NCO, Idaho Code § 18-920, and violating his
probation by committing a new crime.
Following a bench trial, the magistrate found Herren
guilty of violating the NCO by knowingly remaining
within 100 feet of McDermott at the meeting. The
magistrate entered a judgment of conviction. Herren
admitted to violating his probation by being convicted of
the NCO violation, and the magistrate revoked Herren's
withheld judgment for malicious injury to property.
Herren timely appealed his judgment of conviction for
violating the NCO and the revocation of his withheld
judgment to the district court. He filed a motion to
consolidate the appeals, which the district court granted.
Following a hearing, the district court affirmed Herren's
judgment of conviction for violating the NCO, the
probation violation finding, and the revocation of his
withheld judgment. Herren now appeals to this Court.

*2 111 121 131 On review of a decision of the district court,
rendered in its appellate capacity, we review the decision
of the district court directly. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145
Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008); State v.
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217
(Ct.App.2008). We examine the magistrate record to
determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and
whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from
those findings. Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d at 760;
DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217. If those
findings are so supported and the conclusions follow
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the
magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's
decision as a matter of procedure. Losser, 145 Idaho at
672, 183 P.3d at 760; DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d
at 217.
4
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This Court exercises free review over the
application and construction of statutes. State v. Reyes,
139 Idaho 502, 505, 80 P.3d 1103, 1106 (Ct.App.2003).
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
this Court must give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction. State v.
Burnight, 132 Idaho 654,659, 978 P.2d 214,219 (1999);
State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67
(Ct.App.2000). The words must be given their plain,
usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be
construed as a whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829,
25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). If the language is clear and
unambiguous, there is no occasion for the court to resort
to legislative history or rules of statutory interpretation.
facobar, 134 Idaho at 389, 3 P.3d at 67. When this Court
must engage in statutory construction because an
ambiguity exists, it has the duty to ascertain the legislative
intent and give effect to that intent. State v. Beard, 135
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Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.3d 1 16, 121 (Ct.App.200 l ).
181 Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is
limited in scope. A finding of guilt will not be overturned
on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which
a reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito,
I 31 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998);
Statn:. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001
(Ct.App.1991 ).
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Idaho Code § 18-920(2), under which Herren was
convicted, provides that a violation of an NCO is
committed when:
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under any
offense defined in subsection ( 1) of this section; and
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a court
or by an Idaho criminal rule; and
(c) The person charged or convicted has had contact
with the stated person in violation of an order.
(Emphasis added).
In finding Herren guilty of the NCO violation, the
magistrate found the State presented proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that Herren violated the order by
knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott and,
without analysis, concluded this act amounted to a
violation of section 18-920(2). The district court affirmed
these findings. On appeal, Herren argues the courts'
conclusion that he violated section 18-920(2) by
knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott is
erroneous because the common usage of the word
"contact" in the statute dictates that the only violation of
an NCO criminalized by the statute is that which involves
some manner of "communication or physical touching."
The State counters that section 18-920(2) "does not, and
is not intended to, define the meaning of the word
'contact' for purposes of determining whether a violation
of a no contact order has occurred" and any violation of a
NCO suffices.

*3 The provision in the NCO at issue states:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
[Herren]
shall
not
contact
(including: in person or through
another person, or in ·writing or
e-mail, or by telephone, pager or
facsimile) or attempt to contact,
harass, follow, communicate with,

or knowingly remain within 100
feet of: [McDermott].
Thus, it is apparent that by remaining within 100 feet of
McDermott during the meeting, Herren violated the NCO,
which he concedes on appeal; however, the question is
whether this violation of the NCO can amount to a
violation of section 18-920(2).
In arguing he cannot be found to have violated section
18-920(2) because he did not have "contact" with
McDermott according to the plain and ordinary meaning
of the word, Herren cites to Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d
451 (Alaska 2006). In Cooper, a protective order
prohibited the defendant (Husband) from, among other
things, being in the physical presence of his estranged
wife (Wife). Based on several instances where Wife saw
and made eye contact with Husband in various public
places, including the mall, a bar conference and on the
street, Wife claimed Husband committed the crime of
violating the protective order, because, inter alia,
Husband's conduct amounted to "contacting," which was
prohibited by the protective order. The Alaska Supreme
Court noted that for a defendant to be guilty under
Alaska's statute criminalizing the violation of a protective
order, ALASKA STAT. § l 1.56.740(a)(l),' the
underlying protective order must contain at least one of
seven prohibitions enumerated in Alaska Statutes §
18.66. lO0(c )(1 )-(7). 2 On this basis, the Court found the
statute implies that only a violation of a prohibition listed
in section 18.66.l00(c)(l)-(7) may constitute the crime of
violating a protective order. Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457. The
Court found it was significant that the protective order's
requirement that Husband not be in the physical presence
of Wife was not a prohibition explicitly listed in section
18.66.100(c)(1 )-(7) and, therefore, it was questionable
whether Husband's acts could form the basis of a criminal
violation of the protective order. 3 Cooper, 144 P.3d at
457.
Important to the issue we address in this case, the Cooper
court rejected Wife's argument that Husband's acts of
appearing within Wife's sight in public places fell within
one of the enumerated prohibitions listed in section
18.66.100(c)(l )-(7)--specifically, subsection (c)(2) of
section 18.66.100, which provides a protective order may
"prohibit the respondent from ... contacting, or otherwise
communicating directly or indirectly with the petitioner."
(Emphasis added.) Cooper, 144 P.3d at 457. Although
recognizing the argument was not "implausible," the court
rejected it on the basis that the "common usage" of
"contacting," as a verb, means "physically touching or
communicating." Id. at 457-58 (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).
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Noting the general rule of statutory interpretation, that
words in statutes are to be construed in accordance with
their normal usage unless there is some indication a
special meaning is intended, the Court concluded the
context of "contacting" in the relevant statute indicated
that adherence to the normal meaning of the word was
appropriate. Id. at 458. Thus, the Court held that
Husband's acts of merely being present in a public place
while Wife was also present, with contact limited to one
or two seconds of unplanned eye contact and absent any
other communication or touching, were insufficient to
establish Husband violated the no contact prohibition
where the statute criminalizing a violation of a protective
order required the violating behavior be one of the
enumerated acts. Id
*4 1101 As we indicated above, where the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give
effect to the statute as written, without engaging in
statutory construction, Burnight, 132 Idaho at 659, 978
P.2d at 219, and the words of the statute are to be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, Hart, 135 Idaho
at 829, 25 P.3d at 852. Thus, although the State attempts
to distinguish Cooper from the case at hand, we are
constrained to conclude, based on our rules of statutory
interpretation, that section 18-920(2), like Alaska's
statute at the time, does not criminalize all violations of
an NCO. As recognized by the Alaska Supreme Court in
Cooper, and as undisputed by the State in this appeal, the
"common usage" of "contacting," as a verb, means
"physically touching or communicating." Cooper, 144
P.3d at 457-58. Thus, by its plain language, section
18-920(2) only criminalizes violations of an NCO where
the violation was contact in the form of physical touching
and/or communicating.

In resisting this interpretation of the statute, the State
argues:
It is apparent from a plain reading
of the statute and the rule
referenced therein [Idaho Criminal
Rule 46.2] that the legislature did
not intend to define or limit the
meaning of the word contact for
purposes of the content of any
particular no contact order or for
purposes of what will constitute a
violation of the order.
However, although the Legislature may not have
consciously intended to exclude the activity at issue in
this case, that is exactly what it did by its choice of
language, and we are constrained by adherence to our

rules of statutory construction to give effect to the plain
language of the statute. Indeed, there is an argument that
had the Legislature intended the interpretation urged by
the State, it would have stated in the statute that any
violation of an NCO could form the basis of the offense,
as opposed to explicitly requiring "contact" in violation of
an NCO. See, e.g., LC. § 18-7905 (defining first degree
stalking as, inter alia, a violation of Idaho Code §
18-7906 and where the "actions constituting the offense
are in violation of a temporary restraining order,
protection order, no contact order or injunction, or any
combination thereof').
Here, it is undisputed the lower courts found Herren' s act
of knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott
was violative of the NCO. However, such an act does not
amount to physical touching and/or communicating (a
point the State does not contest) and, thus, cannot be
considered "contact" pursuant to section 18-920(2).
Accordingly, we conclude the State failed to sustain its
burden of proving each element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt because there was no evidence Herren
had "contact" with McDermott in violation of the NCO as
required by the plain language of the statute. Because the
magistrate's finding that Herren violated probation was
premised upon this conviction, which in turn caused the
magistrate to revoke Herren's withheld judgment, the
order revoking Herren's withheld judgment on this basis
must be reversed. The district court's order, on
intermediate appeal, affirming Herren's judgment of
conviction for violation of an NCO and affirming
revocation of Herren 's withheld judgment is reversed, and
the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion:

Judge MELANSON concurs.
Chief Judge GRATTON, dissenting.
*5 I respectfully dissent. I believe that the term "contact"
in the context of the legal prohibition, i.e., "no contact," is
well understood and consistent with the use of the term in
Idaho Code § 18-920(2)(c). I submit that the plain
meaning of"contact" to anyone involved in the context of
a no contact order (as opposed to say the business world)
includes being in the vicinity of the other person. I further
submit that the term "contact" is, by virtue of the statutory
language in J.C. § 18-920 and Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2,
defined as that which is set out in the no contact order
itself, which must include a distance restriction. The
majority, unfortunately, limits itself to a generic definition
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of the word ''contact" without regard to the legal and
commonly understood context of"no" contact orders.
l do not believe it is appropriate that when our standards
of statutory construction call for application of the plain
meaning of a word, that we immediately consult
Webster's Dictionary. The plain meaning of a word is as
commonly understood and articulated within the context
used, not some generic Webster's Dictionary definition.
This case highlights just how we should not rely on one of
Webster's Dictionary's several definitions of "contact."
Herren argues that "contact" means "physical touching or
communicating." Herren and the majority adopt this
definition of "contact" from Cooper v. Cooper, 144 P.3d
451, 457-58 (Alaska 2006), which, in tum, purportedly
adopted the definition from Webster's Dictionary.' Since
there is no physical touching in this case, Herren and the
majority then are required to delve into what is meant by
"communicating." Herren argues and the majority agrees
that being in someone's presence is not communicating
and, moreover, brief eye contact is not communicative
and, thus, not contact, so long as there is no non-verbal
communication involved with the eye contact, which I
suppose to mean the old evil eye. So, "contact" actually
becomes "communicating" and then we are required to
define "communicating," and so on. Through this
circuitous route the majority determines that knowingly
being in another's presence is not "contact" within the
meaning of J.C. § 18--920(2)(c), because there is no
touching or communicating.
Idaho Code § 18--920, under which Herren was
prosecuted, is entitled: "Violation of No Contact Order."
(Emphasis added.) Subsection (2) states:
(2) A violation of a no contact order is committed
when:
(a) A person has been charged or convicted under
any offense defined in subsection (1) of this section;
and
(b) A no contact order has been issued, either by a
court or by an Idaho criminal rule; and
(c) The person charged or convicted has had contact
with the stated person in violation of an order.
(Emphasis added.) To say that the term "contact" in LC. §
18-920(2)(c) does not draw meaning from the "no contact
Footnotes
The statute has since been amended.

order " is untenable. Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2, entitled
"[n]o contact orders," states that no contact orders issued
pursuant to l.C. § 18-920 must be in writing and served
on the defendant. Each judicial district shall adopt by
administrative order a form for no contact orders. The rule
further provides that:
*6 No contact orders must contain, at a minimum, the
following information:
(1) The case number, defendant's name and victim's
name;
(2) A distance restriction;
(3) That the order will expire at l I :59 p.m. on a
specific date, or upon dismissal of the case;
(4) An advisory that:
(a) A violation of the order may be prosecuted as a
separate crime under I.C. § 18-920 for which no
bail will be set until an appearance before a judge,
and the possible penalties for this crime, ....
I.C.R. 46.2(a). (Emphasis added.) It is clear from the full
statute that that the "contact" which is "in violation of
[the] order," identified in LC. § 18-920(2)(c), is that
which is set out in the order. It is clear from the rule that
the "contact" which is punishable by J.C. § 18--920 is that
which is set out in the order. It is also clear from the
required language in the no contact order itself, which
includes an advisory that violation of the order may be
prosecuted under J.C. § 18-920, that it is the "contact"
described in the order which is punishable under LC. §
18-920. One need not resort to Webster's Dictionary to
determine what "contact" means in the context of a no
contact order. If fact, the Webster's Dictionary definition,
presents much more confusion and less certainty than the
language of the order which must be served on the
defendant.
In this case, Herren does not seriously contest that he
knowingly remained with I 00 feet of McDermott in
violation of the no contact order. Thus, I respectfully
dissent.
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Alaska Statutes § 18.66.100( c )( I }-(7) provided that a protective order may:
( 1) prohibit the respondent from threatening to commit or committing domestic violence, stalking. or harassment;
(2) prohibit the respondent from telephoning. contacting, or otherwise communicating directly or indirectly with the
petitioner;
(3) remove and exclude the respondent from the residence of the petitioner, regardless of ownership of the residence;
(4) direct the respondent to stay away from the residence. school, or place of employment of the petitioner or any specified
place frequented by the petitioner or any designated household member;
(5) prohibit the respondent from entering a propelled vehicle in the possession of or occupied by the petitioner;
(6) prohibit the respondent from using or possessing a deadly weapon if the court finds the respondent was in the actual
possession of or used a weapon during the commission of domestic violence;
(7) direct the respondent to surrender any firearm owned or possessed by the respondent if the court finds that the respondent
was in the actual possession of or used a firearm during the eommission of the domestic violence[.]

3

The Court did point out that this finding did not mean the lower court was not authorized to include an "in-the-presence''
prohibition in the protective order. Although such a provision could not be enforced by the criminal statute, it could be enforceable
by contempt or possibly other means. Cooper v. Cooper. 144 P.3d 451. 457 (Alaska 2006).

4

We note that although Herren's conduct of knowingly remaining within 100 feet of McDermott may not form the basis of a
violation of Idaho Code § 18-920(2), it may nonetheless constitute a violation of the NCO and still be a violation of his probation,
depending on the terms of probation. Therefore, revocation of Herren· s withheld judgment may still be appropriate.
The phrase "physical touching or communicating" does not appear in Webster's Third New International Dictionary, and, instead,
appears to be the Alaska Court's amalgam of words found therein.
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